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The Call and the Phenomenon  
François Laruelle 
University of Paris X (Nanterre) 
Some philosophers (Bergson, Heidegger) have introduced the Call in 
their doctrine. Yet none have ventured the integral “phenomenological” 
description, and none have grounded the whole of their problematic, as well 
as their ‘method’, on the Call as Call. This is now being done by Jean-Luc 
Marion. The outlines of the project are traced: a new philosophical territory 
is open, limited yet well-defined, surrounded by prestigious neighbors 
(distantly, Husserl and Heidegger, and, nearer, Henry and Levinas); a field 
of descriptive possibilities is liberated and mapped. One can judge the 
importance of the Call in Jean-Luc Marion if one compares this structure and 
its description to those of the question in Heidegger, the immanence of the ego 
and life in Henry, the face of the Other in Levinas, etc. by which of course each 
thinker distinguishes himself. The Call is not only the real core of Reduction 
and Givenness, but what actually organizes cross-readings of Husserl and 
Heidegger, and, in general, the repetition of the possibilities of 
phenomenology. The Call as Call is thus elevated as a concept, and it will be 
necessary to reckon with this new “object”, which is neither the Greek Being, 
nor the Judaic Other, neither Difference nor the Same, but which certainly 
attempts to “surpass” and “raise”, in its own manner, these “great kinds” of 
our time. The problem is an old one: how to still philosophize, how to 
continue after X or Y, after Husserl or Heidegger? It will be shown that in 
these classical contexts Jean-Luc Marion exhibits a reversal and 
displacement, yet subordinates them to another operation by which he 
attempts not only to extend phenomenology but to close it in on itself. This 
operation will be called a decision of identity: the identity of the contrary 
positions of Husserl and Heidegger, and more recently, Henry and Levinas. 
In a sense, this is a prodigious operation. We will interrogate its structure –  
if not its possibility because nothing forbids it –that is specific to 
philosophizing and gives it its “authenticity.” 
Rare are those philosophers who generously greet the birth of another. 
Yet this is not at all the case with Jean-Luc Marion; he is truly a philosopher 
of generosity. As for the notes which follow, they are intended to fix a date 
and rank, to set out a probably endless debate, to identify a line of fracture in 
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all our disputes which will better demonstrate their unbridgeable character. 
Consequently, this is neither a “philosophical” nor “historical” critique, 
instead it is simply a marking out of that which can distinguish a philosophy 
– even a “new” one – from what we could call a “non-philosophy.” Yet, it 
remains the case that this reading of Marion’s “position,” its structures and 
decisions, could be based on errors of comprehension. Nothing along this 
order can be excluded.  
The Repetition of the Possibilities of Philosophy 
By what traditional criteria does one appraise a philosopher? Marion 
clearly possesses to the highest degree the techniques of reading, exposition, 
and argumentation proper to historians of philosophy: their precision. 
Above all, he possesses a force of decision and an authority of 
demonstration which interests us, a capacity to remain faithful to his 
decisions. All this is part of the proper rigor of philosophers. Some examples 
of this classicism are as follows: 
1. The repetition of the possibilities of the phenomenological tradition 
takes the form of a teleological recovery of the internal history and logic of 
phenomenology, a regulated succession of historico-systematic figures. 
History is here put in the service of an intention to demonstrate with which 
it is merged. 
2. Phenomenology is conceived as a teleologically oriented tradition, 
which therefore still contains possibilities – more particularly, a still 
unexplored ultimate possibility, which is to be made manifest. It has the style 
of a phenomenological repetition, grounded in the continuity of an Idea 
distinguished from its previous realizations. It exceeds or surpasses them by 
turning them against themselves:  
A unique question: can the conditions of presence extend 
themselves to the point that they exceed all being, beyond 
the limits fixed by previous states of metaphysics, even by 
all possible metaphysics? Can the givenness in presence of 
each thing be accomplished without any condition or 
restriction.1 
It is thus a matter of “receiving that which gives itself as it gives itself.”2 The 
philosopher’s genius consists in reopening the question of the “real” or of 
the “given.” The authentic philosophical genius of Marion consists in 
reopening by surprise the questions of Husserl or Nietzsche, which are 
believed to have been already realized or closed off. Clearly, this 
phenomenological telos takes a broadened form and relies on decisions that 
are distinct from those of Husserl, since they “surpass” Husserl against 
himself, or Nietzsche against himself (one should welcome the unexpected 
introduction of Nietzsche in the broadened phenomenological field, even 
though it is – through a doctrinal and historical remnant of empiricism – in 
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an unrealized form that Husserl will later realize; however, in all respects, 
Nietzsche is a more radical and accomplished phenomenologist than 
Husserl, who retains something of the subject-object relation outside of 
manifestation, whereas Nietzsche rids himself of this fetishism and delivers 
phenomenology from the shackles of the “object” form and assigns it 
“difference” as difference). 
3. The real relation between the historico-systematic description and the 
object to which it leads (the Call) is the inverse of the apparent relation 
followed by the book. The “pure form” of the Call is only what produces the 
exigency of phenomenality because it orders, a priori, the deciphering and 
repetition of the tradition. Without the Call, without its special structure, the 
decisions of the interpreter-historian, as in the critiques of Derrida or the 
uses of Heidegger, are incomprehensible or opposed to the stated intentions 
of the authors in question. As always in this type of philosophical 
“demonstration,” the Call appears as a miraculous result of logic and history 
combined, although it is in fact the invariant eidetic structure which renders 
them intelligible. 
4. The statement that the doctrine utilized here — phenomenology — is 
“the philosophy of our time,” is a traditional, yet inevitable, statement: this 
kind of axiom is universal and pertains to every philosophy. This bears 
witness to a historical and doctrinal empiricism that is not peculiar to 
Marion – which we will later call a philosophical faith – and which gives rise 
to the persisting paradoxes of every philosophy: (1) every philosophy is and 
is not phenomenological, and it is “metaphysical” to the extent that it is not 
yet phenomenological; (2) there is a double concept of phenomenology, 
divided between its actual realizations and a telos which surpasses them; (3) 
to think is to utilize a doctrine that has already reached beyond itself; (4) 
failure is also success, etc.:  
phenomenology needs to confront the next dilemma: 
disappearing as a philosophical discipline, admitting that 
its method […] no longer depends on the question of 
Being any more than that it could previously limit itself to 
the objective of objectivity.3 
For recent French phenomenologists the phenomenological approach only 
rests on the basis of its own protocols of thought, either on this side or that 
side of the constitution of the object and of beings in their being.  
We have, in the following pages, attempted nothing more 
than to free the phenomenological approach as such, 
without confusing it with successive and, in a sense, 
provisional objectives. If in phenomenology – as opposed 
to metaphysics – possibility truly surpasses actuality, it is 
necessary to push this principle to its end, until eventually 
exercising it against phenomenology as already 
actualized, for one does not overcome a true thinking by 
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refuting it, but by repeating it, or even by borrowing from 
it the means to think with it beyond it. Then even failure 
succeeds.4 
The Two Specific Decisions of Jean-Luc Marion 
The criterion of the repetition of the possibilities of phenomenology – 
“strict phenomenological rigor” – is presented as the equation given = 
received. The reduction of being to the phenomenon only takes its sense from 
the radical reduction of the phenomenon to what is strictly given and  
received. This criterion will remain undetermined for now – only the Call will 
fulfill its requirements or realize it – but we can describe its sense.  
First, it is a matter of asserting, against Heidegger and Husserl, the idea 
of a demonstration of complete givenness, an absolute Parousia. Husserl 
does not remain faithful to this Idea, and it is quite clear that Heidegger 
refuses or describes it as “metaphysical.” We can therefore, without 
obfuscating, admire the violence of this decision, so profoundly contrary to 
the stated intentions of Heidegger, which in effect makes the project of a 
“phenomenology of the unapparent”5 contradictory. We will refrain from 
objecting to Marion with regard to the choice of this universal criterion 
which serves as a repetition, critique and surpassing. Only “historians” 
could make an objection, but here it is only the historian as a philosopher who 
draws his right from something other than history. There is no philosophy 
without this somewhat exorbitant type of decision. It explains the 
requirement of the continual broadening and universalization of pure 
givenness beyond the limits or restrictions of intuition - sensible as well as 
categorical - beyond beings, Dasein, the Ego and Being, etc., and thus the 
phenomenological norms that are imposed on the cross-critiques of Husserl 
and Heidegger are clearly impossible for them. 
 Second, and more profoundly, the new phenomenological criterion 
signifies the identity of reception and givenness, of manifestation and the 
given – of phenomenology and ontology (an “ontology” without Being, yet 
not without reality). It is perhaps risky to develop this hypothesis, but it 
sheds light on everything. Marion has attempted a sort of radical identity of 
the two great opposing poles of phenomenology, Husserl and Heidegger, 
rather than a “synthesis.” Synthesis is the classic solution in the history of 
philosophy (cf. Hegel), because philosophy is always able to attempt this 
kind of synthesis. But, as an ultimate phenomenological possibility (in 
reality it changes the very concept of phenomenology),  here it takes the 
form of the identity between complete manifestation without remainder and 
reality understood as transcendens, “überhaupt.” It is the Identity of radical 
immanence (which is necessary in order to ensure the complete 
manifestation that Husserl “sought”) and the most universal transcendence 
(which necessary to ensure the reality of the given that Heidegger “sought”). 
The driving force of the entire enterprise, and indeed of the repetition of the 
tradition, is in this identity of Husserl and Heidegger, and consequently 
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which is neither one nor the other alone. Hence, this results in a system of 
choices or interpretative decisions, a style of refusals successively opposed 
and “zigzagging” one from the other in supposedly falling short of the 
criterion; or lacking it, the “object” in relation to the phenomenon and the 
phenomenon in relation to its object.  
 Being and Appearance, the manifested and manifestation, etc., are identical: 
they are not “the same,” that is, different(s). This time the equation exceeds a 
Nietzschean form, which is, in effect, regulated by difference or the same, 
rather than by strict identity. Marion does away not only with Being, but 
also with difference and becoming – which prove to be inseparable – and 
“transcends” them towards what will be resolved in being recognized as the 
One – that is, a form of the One, for example, of the One “without Being.” In 
this manner, he radicalizes the phenomenological ideal and creates an ultra-
Husserlian extension of it: everything that is real is identically manifested or 
given; everything that is given or manifested is identically real. It is clear that, 
not being dialectical, this identity of contraries will turn out to be very 
limited and void of the onto-phenomenological determinations that it has 
surpassed without conserving. It is dialectically weakened by a tearing-away 
rather than a synthesis, as will be seen.  
The Eidetic Structure of “Tearing-away-from”  
How are the Dyad and Identity organized? The regressive approach is 
towards ultimate principles and pure results. Instead of leading toward the 
being of the Call or even the Call of Being (Heidegger), the call that is 
beyond Being precedes it, no doubt just as the One precedes it. However, the 
“method” remains one of moving from one doublet or mixture to another, 
ascending by way of a decision through the dyads (given/givenness; 
appearing/appearance; given/received; call/affection, etc.: but also 
Nietzsche/Husserl, Husserl/Heidegger, Henry/Levinas, etc.). Overall, and 
even classically, dualities are in fact three terms or trinities (the given, 
givenness, reception; or the given, givenness, and their identity, etc.), 
precisely because a stricture – that of Identity – is necessary in order to 
restrain or purify them. 
 Phenomenology is therefore condemned to parallel structures and 
doublets – as all philosophy is, evidently. It requires phenomenalization – 
that is, the side of immanence, of reception, of affection, and of 
manifestation to the human being; and the side of the given or of the 
received, of the receptivity of the real, of transcendence. Marion fulfils this 
requirement. Clearly, the “principle of all principles” is purified and 
radicalized beyond the couplet of intuition-presence. Intentionality, ecstasy 
and even difference are removed from the interior or from the syntax of this 
doublet, instead they are replaced– this, in our point of view, is Marion’s 
originality – with a strict identity, a One that is only One. Yet, the problem is 
that this stricture or this constriction – this reduction – wants to lose nothing 
of philosophy. Its lets duality remain in simultaneous dimensions, in the 
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form of the doublet: immanence as the condition of phenomenality and 
reduced to the “me”; transcendence as the condition of receiving the real, a 
pure phenomenon of the Call or of Givenness, which is itself the ultimate 
Given. These two dimensions are emptied of their ontico-ontological 
diversity, in order to together constitute the Call as Call. 
Hence, there is a double effect which explains this style of 
phenomenological repetition:  
1) On the one hand, identity proceeds by a quasi-dissolution of 
metaphysical amphibolies and holds one term against the other (Being 
contra beings, Dasein contra the Ego, the Call contra Being, inauthenticity 
contra authenticity).6 Identity requires a radical distinction or a 
“dualization”: a purification on the conserved side and a “unilateralization” 
on the side formed by ontico-ontological diversity. 
2) Even so, it only unilateralizes the diversity of objects or authors, 
but it still conserves the general form of the Dyad. Concretely, it clearly does 
not differentiate the positions; it does not displace their connection. Instead, it 
proceeds from a decision or absolute break, choosing an author and 
identifying, on the one hand, the abandoned term and, on the other, the 
residual or conserved term.7 Yet, it maintains reference to the surpassed 
term, on behalf of the very broadening or continual extension of the ideal of 
phenomenality.  
How then to combine – in the Call itself and in the “method” that it 
implies – the abolition, by Identity, of the confusion of already actualized 
identification and the continuing reference to the surpassed term? The 
answer is clear: through the Call itself inasmuch as every “call” – even in an 
initial empirical description that is not yet phenomenological – functions as 
a tearing-away, rather than a negation, a differentiation, or a withdrawal, etc. 
Transcendence “calls” or tears away from the empirical, and this tearing-
away-from is the ultimate eidetic structure, the originary experience which 
replaces intentionality or ecstasy, and even the Schritt zurück. The Call is 
indeed primary. But, since it has the mode of transcendence, it remains 
relative to a term that it does not deny but abandons. It can therefore no 
longer really unilateralize it or reject it as distant and absolutely contingent. The 
Call manifests itself first, but only by remaining relative to what it tears us 
away from. Therefore, the “empirical” (including beings and Being) is the 
negative, and perhaps passive condition of the Call as a pure form that can 
only tear us away from philosophies by ultimately presupposing them. The 
description of the formal structure of the Call (its recognition, its surprise, 
the identification of the self, its facticity) is made in order to overcome 
beings, and therefore Being, but they remain as a negative pole of reference 
for what is no longer an auto-position, an anticipatory resolution or a 
question. The Call is perhaps a question in return, or an ecstasy in return, 
the absolute relation of God to the human that only abolishes the latter in the 
mode of tearing-away or, perhaps, in election. A “call” in general is nothing 
other than this structure which combines the identity of the calling-called 
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and the abandonment of what, in the called, is still ultimately necessary in 
order for there to even be a call. Transcendence is always “relative-to.” 
Clearly, being absolute as Identity and entrusted to it alone, what it is 
relative to can only be a negative condition; even so, a condition subsists for 
the unconditioned. This allows for the continual surpassing of authors and of 
already actualized positions, as well as the Identity (of) Call which is first.  
The Internal Limitation of a Philosophy of the Call 
It is therefore likely that this radicalization of phenomenology will only 
destroy all non-phenomenological preliminaries and will resolve itself in a 
strategy. Marion combines together the first Identity of the Call and 
philosophical decision as inseparable: he finally makes a decision of identity, 
and it cannot completely abolish every decision or every relativity-to – as is 
also the case with other thinkers. The Call has the internal form of a Dyad in 
which one of the terms will have been “absolutized” – it becomes the One 
without Being – but yet remains relative to the other as a negative condition. 
It joins the fold or the doublet with the One that turns back on it.  
 This solution allows him to turn against two authors: it excludes 
Henry’s position of radical immanence without transcendence and Levinas’s 
transcendence without the immanence of reception. But it only does this by 
demonstrating a desire to conserve to the utmost the most fundamental 
matrix of philosophy – that of the Dyad, Fold or Doublet. All of the interest 
in Levinas’s or Henry’s solutions was to remove it and arrive at – though in 
each case in a very different mode – a genuinely simple thought without a 
fold:  a thought of the One that does not turn back into a dyad. They sought 
to think a unilateral relation which breaks down bilateral and reciprocal 
duality. They were not content with only breaking down its more empiricist  
or contemporary forms – for instance, Husserl’s “correlational a priori” – but 
the very Idea of correlation or co-belonging. The thoughts of the One or of 
the Simple, with the Unilaterality which results from them (with Henry and 
Levinas for example), do not presuppose an empirical term in order to 
abolish it. They treat it in the accusative rather than the dative case, and they 
annihilate every dialectic, even an ultra-positive one like this. Marion is 
literally right – against Henry, for example - when he says there is no 
affection without an Other or an Affectant. But this does not exceed 
philosophy and its traditional matrix, in which he has as much faith as in 
God. As a result, the real originality of the examined solution – the return to a 
certain “adequation,” which is no longer ontico-ontological – remains limited by 
the conservation of this “philosophical” form: the unity-of-contraries. It is 
only regulated, but not excised. We will see later that philosophy and its 
decisions continue to condition the Call itself from the exterior, because the 
call is only a tearing-away from philosophy, from its “shackled” (ontico-
ontological) forms, rather than a radical suspension of all possible 
philosophy. We will see that boredom does not go as far as veritable 
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indifference and that it still does not have the greatest possible reductive 
force. 
The Phenomenological Decision: A Non-Phenomenological 
Preliminary 
The ultimate possibility of phenomenology should no longer be a 
possibility, but a reality. Its radical possibilization should be its actualization 
as Call. The phenomenological process should envelop itself, should enclose 
without folding back on itself, in the revelation of the Call, and 
phenomenology should itself be a phenomenon, the reduction should be the 
ultimate given, the givenness equal to the given. 
However, it is necessary to ask if this identity of the given and 
givenness, of the manifested and reduction, is really without remainder. It is 
necessary to ask if it is not matter of a decision – no doubt, an absolute one – 
but one which remains - as a decision - outside of manifestation and falls 
outside of the given and received.  Finally, it is necessary to ask if an identity 
can be the object of a decision or if philosophy does not encounter here an 
ultimate failure of its will to manifest itself. 
What decision remains in the Call? The “decision of identity”: this 
formula is as violent as the thing it describes. The Call no doubt surprises 
decision (without ontologically anticipating it), but it is embodied in the 
decisions of the history of phenomenology, as has been seen, and only auto-
manifests itself through these “decisions” which the Call requires as the 
repetition of this history. The subtle problem is therefore this: can the 
counter-decisions of the Call “overcome” the metaphysical decisions of 
phenomenology, and really exceed them without remainder? Certainly not, 
since they need them as their “negative” conditions. In this function at least, 
the “decision” subsists outside of the Call, and as a result, it is impossible for 
phenomenology to realize the principle of the absence of presuppositions. 
The priority of the Call over Being, over Auto-Position and Decision, 
remains one of a Prius a priori, but it is marked by the fact or facticity.8 In this 
case, how could one not admit a last trace of empirical facticity, that is to 
say, of philosophical facticity (of actualized phenomenology or the 
tradition)? Hence, among other effects, there is an inversion of the order of 
phenomenological knowledge (repetition) in relation to the order of the real 
(the Call) – in the manner of the classic circle of all philosophy – at the site of 
their overlapping. And, above all, there is a problem in the status of the 
reduction as surpassing. One cannot speak of a Hegelian Aufhebung, but the 
Call is the Christian nucleus that will order this, the real heart of every result 
and reduction – and therefore it is the pure form of the result. As for the 
status of the reduced and the suspended, or of the surpassed, it is inevitable that 
in the doublet of the given and givenness in their first or final identity, in 
givenness being the given – givenness and the phenomenological operations 
that accompany it, like the reduction, finally fall outside of the absolute 
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Given, or of their identity, and remain its negative condition or its non-
manifested presupposition. The identity of terms in the dyad is only ensured by 
one of them; the other can only fall outside of the absolute manifestation that 
it realizes. 
Phenomenology therefore does not only exceed ontology: there is also a 
“bad” excess, a resistance of phenomenology itself to the phenomenon, a 
resistance of its operations and conditions to its results. Phenomenology is 
equally a system of operations and of fateful decisions that are designed to 
render manifest more and more broad layers of reality; they are designed to 
give a phenomenal status to what withdraws from the phenomenon or what 
presents itself “at first sight” as dissimulated. It is impossible to ignore these 
operations when they are of a philosophical type. The power of 
deconstruction, for example, is that it marks the limits of this effacement or 
forgetting. Phenomenology would need to be the final phenomenon, and 
close itself off within the ultra-ontological adequation of the One, but in fact 
the result is the inadequation of phenomenology to the phenomenon that it 
produces or rather contributes to produce. 
This failure of phenomenology to manifest itself is not peculiar to this 
tradition. It is an essential law of every philosophy – whether as auto-position 
(Fichte, Hegel), as super-position (Nietzsche), as de-position (Heidegger), as the 
Call – that its operation, as a decision (either positive or “negative”), 
excludes itself from the real or from its results. Moreover, the Dyad, by 
which a philosophy always commences, is never entirely reabsorbed into the 
One, if the latter at least has not been recognized as of primary significance. 
It is important that the book in question is titled Reduction and Givenness 
rather than The Call and the Phenomenon (for instance), because this title is a 
symptom which demonstrates that the theoretical apparatus remains a co-
constitutive preliminary that excludes itself from its products and makes 
phenomenology fail in relation to itself and its ideal of absolute Parousia.  
How far can the Ego, Being, and the Other go with respect to the 
phenomenon? Marion knows that these types of questions deploy 
requirements which go beyond the powers of Husserl, Heidegger, and 
others. Yet, philosophy is an infernal machine that always slips from the 
hands of those who manipulate it: it cannot satisfy this requirement of 
absolute manifestation. Phenomeno-logy is rightly what falls outside of the 
phenomenon; it is never given. Ego and World, Difference, Withdrawal, and 
even the Call in its decisional aspect, all these fall outside of the 
phenomenon. In order to avoid this aporia, it would be necessary to change 
the terrain, to pass from a philosophical conception to probably a “scientific” 
experience of the phenomenon as radical immanence. The telos of 
phenomenology is always betrayed: because it is only a telos and because to 
philosophize is to betray the reality of the One. The return to the things will 
be endless and will miss the phenomenon. The analysis of the figures of 
phenomenological Reason (object, Dasein, Ego, Region, Call, etc.) only 
demonstrates the agony of philosophy. No philosophy ever attains its 
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intentions. It never attains the real, because it remains within realization, or 
the One, because it remains within identification. The brilliant example that 
we have examined shows this once again. 
From God-without-Being to the One-without-Being: From 
Philosophy to Non-Philosophy 
We have not yet made a philosophical type of “critique.” We have 
shown, rather, the author’s rigor, that is, his ultimate fidelity to philosophy. 
Yet, we have highlighted, in his case, the most general and most persistent 
aporias of the philosophical style of thought. How can one “escape” the 
aporias of which philosophy itself cannot escape, or rather, how can one 
“avoid” them? 
The Call presupposes the Other, the desertion and inauthenticity of the I 
as me. Yet this does not have a Judaic sense, since the Call is completely 
manifested and is accepted-received rather than refused. With Henry 
(immanence) against Levinas, and with Levinas (the Other) against Henry, 
the most authentically Christian of territories is traced. Marion does not 
want to abandon philosophy – its Greek element – but only to be torn away 
from it by a Call – by God, rather than by a thought that is other than 
philosophical. He wants to be Christian from the point of view of the real, 
and a philosopher – once again, though it is definitive or unsurpassable – 
from the point of view of thought. He wants to continue to reduce and 
describe. He turns the philosopher into a final negative condition, and he 
turns the Christian into the way of surpassing the onto-theological structure 
of metaphysics. He joins the human to God and God to philosophy, instead 
of joining the human to itself or of leaving philosophy to its non-human 
destiny. Either one is a philosopher who makes, in extremis, the leap of the 
Call – but we can hardly believe that this is the case – or else one is a 
Christian who is compelled, in spite of oneself, to do philosophy. One is 
asked to tear oneself away from philosophy without actually forsaking it. He 
is less Nietzschean with respect to God – as is sometimes thought – than a 
believer with respect to philosophy. Faith thinks. It seeks out the 
phenomenological intelligence that it consumes in the call or in generosity: 
humans take part in this without being able to choose it – except as 
philosopher. 
How could we abandon philosophy without regret, without a “tearing-
away-from”? In general, one does not abandon philosophy, but only one 
philosophical theory for another. This occurs precisely for reasons of 
philosophical faith, or out of boredom or even for reasons of religious faith 
that are partly linked with philosophical faith itself. In both cases, the 
recourse to transcendence exalts philosophical faith and religious faith in 
relation to one another. But one abandons the whole of philosophy – 
spontaneous philosophical faith –by indifference, that is, by recourse to 
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immanence alone. Philosophy is not an intermediary between these two 
extremes – Faith and Science – it is entirely on the side of Faith. And the only 
solution in order to really escape philosophical aporias is to avoid them a 
priori. This is not to posit the identity of two “opposed” doctrines, but to 
elucidate first the essence of Identity itself as being first of all given, this 
identity to which one resorts in a blind and grasping manner; to elucidate its 
internal structure, its entirely immanent phenomenality, rather than to 
requisition it in order to resolve the aporias of the history of 
phenomenology. For instance, if the Call remains partly “relative-to” 
phenomenological decisions, what identity will assure this relation in an 
ultimate manner but a fold, the fold of transcendence or of the double 
decision: as operative and counter? But does not this fold itself, as the entire 
reality of the Call, presuppose a condition that is more ultimate than the Call 
itself? Does it not presuppose instead of a new form of transcendence – there 
is none anymore – this time, a radical immanence – the One as the One or 
without Being – sufficing as the real and stronger than God himself? Either, 
the precedence of the Call over Being is really absolute and not at all 
relative, and it will have the Judaic form of the Other, which Marion does 
not want. Or, it will also be relative, in the temperate manner which we have 
seen, and nothing – except for a miracle – would prevent the Call from 
referring to a more ultimate requirement. 
It will then be necessary to renounce the most fundamental 
philosophical presuppositions: discourse would be more than descriptive 
and would be co-constitutive of the essence of the real, at least as its negative 
condition. But the phenomenological endeavor only conditions the 
representation of the One rather than the One itself, unless it renounces 
thinking in the philosophical matrix from the outset, in the mould of the 
dyad or of the doublet and admits that the Given absolutely precedes (the 
decision of) Givenness, or reduces the Reduction (language and operations), that 
this is already effected, but absolutely effected, that it does not surprise us 
but belongs to the Given itself, to the One which has “already” suspended 
its ontico-ontological pretensions, without them even being able to be 
manifest. It is only manifested within their suspension. We have always 
lived within the reduction. There is no need to stop the reduction – it has 
never begun. There is no need to phenomenalize phenomena – the 
phenomenon is actual. Consider Sartre’s objection to Husserl, which is more 
or less the following: it is less a matter of  effecting  or carrying out the  
reduction than of seeing it as  already completed and achieved, once and for 
all, with the need to perpetually recommence it without ever attaining its 
goal. Marion multiplies the reductions and discovers a third one, which he 
realizes must be singular, “without call” as the Call itself – it may be 
recognized or not, but it is actual as Call. It must be both a 
phenomenological possibility and close the internal history of 
phenomenology. But how then are we not obliged to continue when one 
thus engages in the possible and transcendence and when one follows “the 
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wind of every possible call.”9 It is difficult not to imagine the hand of God – 
Joshua stopping the course of the sun – reversing the flight in, and of, 
transcendence, suppressing the operative and decisional transcendence of 
phenomenology by the counter-transcendence of His returned hand – the 
Call. This miraculous and divine inversion has taken up the torch from the 
inversion or of the reversal as philosophical operations, but has not removed 
them.  
Is this desire to forsake or leave philosophy the result of having never 
consistently let oneself be torn away from it? Clearly not: it is a question of 
understanding philosophy by understanding that it has always already 
“forsaken” us; or indeed, that it is we who have given it its leave; that we do 
not have to tear ourselves away from it because we always keep it at a 
distance, have kept it away, and have never returned to it. In brief, philosophy 
exists; there has never been a philosophical faith, but the only philosophical faith has 
been the belief that there is philosophical faith. This is the Good News, which is no 
longer confused with the Call. The priority of the Given over Givenness, of the 
Phenomenon over Phenomenalization, is no more than a dogmatic thesis as 
soon as it becomes a question of the One as One that is absolutely and non-
relatively “without Being.” And it determines a new use of language and, 
for instance, of phenomenological operations. This use is no longer directed 
by the Call and its aporias, like those of the given and givenness, but by this 
absolute precedence, without remainder or reserve, of the Given over the 
operations of reduction-givenness. This priority of pure Identity, without 
transcendence this time, establishes a radical unilateralization – without 
blending – of all of philosophy itself and not merely some of its objects or 
authors. The “empirical” condition thus takes on another expression: there is 
indeed an emprical “given” in addition to the One as One. This is ontico-
ontological diversity in effect. It is not necessary to go back to an absolute 
creation (Levinas) or an absolute destruction (Henry) – an absolute without 
an object that is there, without the empirical. Yet the empirical is not 
constitutive of the One either. The One as One renders the empirical ontico-
ontological diversity absolutely contingent. It provides for this condition 
without rendering it constitutive, etc. This solution to the aporias of 
philosophy is called “non-philosophy.” 
One should applaud Marion – if these interpretative hypotheses are 
correct – for positing the strict identity of contraries rather than their 
mediation or their differentiation. From our point of view, this marks progress 
in the suspension of the pretensions of philosophy and in the demonstration 
of its lack of validity. Nevertheless, thought here only reaches a crossroads, 
because this identity now needs to be “founded” and to be given its absolute 
reality. The choice is therefore as follows. One can either found it in an 
ultimate manner – not relative-to – through a new recourse to transcendence 
that entrusts the Call to itself “as Call.” But, could this fold of transcendence 
– which dissimulates itself and hides its own existence – ever signify 
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anything other than God who is this identity by and for transcendence? Or 
one could understand that this strict identity of contraries is founded on its 
own and therefore in an identity which is only identity – this time, in a 
radical immanence of the One as One, where this structure of the Call would 
be rooted. Then, one would surely need to change its name. 
Marion’s work will be welcomed for this recourse, a little more direct 
than elsewhere, to identity or to the One. But, it is regrettable that the One is 
only a “call” or a tearing away from Being, instead of being its most radical 
reduction, its contingency outside of the One. This half-measure, here less 
timid than elsewhere, is called “philosophy.” To summarize it in one stroke: 
God will never have really been “without Being.” “Without Being” cannot 
be said of God but only of the One that renders Being definitively contingent 
and expels it outside of itself. As for God, He is only that which tears itself 
away from Being. He needs philosophers. 
  
 
                                                                  
 
* Originally published in French as François Laruelle, "L’Appel et le Phénomène," 
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 1996 (1): 27–41. English translation by Kris 
Pender. 
1 Jean-Luc Marion, Réduction et Donation (Paris: PUF, 1989), 7. 
2 Marion, Réduction et Donation, 8. 
3 Marion, Réduction et Donation, 9. 
4 Marion, Réduction et Donation, 9-10. 
5 Marion, Réduction et Donation, 9. 
6 Marion, Réduction et Donation, 282. 
7 Hence the curious interpretation  of "surpassing" Heidegger (RD, 292): the choice 
of inauthenticity rests on Marion’s use of the alternative of 
authenticity/inauthenticity as "entirely" given, that is, as identity rather than as 
difference (as Heidegger himself would have it). 
8 Marion, Réduction et Donation, 301. 
9 Marion, Réduction et Donation, 294. 
 
 
 
